A Military Legend

Major James M. Stewart, USAAF, Group Operations Officer, 453rd Bombardment Group (Heavy), counting planes after a mission. RAF Old Buckenham, 1944.

Jimmy Stewart with his mother and father.

Background

Jimmy Stewart with costar Ginger Rogers in "Vivacious Lady."

Jimmy Stewart in MGM film "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington."

World War II

James M. Stewart enlists as a private in the United States Army, 22 March 1941. (Los Angeles Times).

Jimmy Stewart with Henry O. Wittman at California’s Moffett Field, July 1941. Wittman sent this photo to his cousin, Mary Thomas. He was killed during a training flight in 1943.

Corporal James M. Stewart was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant at Moffett Field, Calif., on January 19, 1942. (National Archives).

Major Stewart, then executive officer, 2nd Bombardment Wing, after a mission on 23 July 1944.

Lt. Colonel James Stewart, 453rd Group Operations Officer, debriefing pilots after a B-24 raid over Berlin.

Jimmy Stewart going through a pre-flight checklist.

Jimmy Stewart being awarded the French Croix de Guerre with palm.

After World War II

Jimmy Stewart as George Bailey contemplating suicide in "It's a Wonderful Life."

Jimmy Stewart expressing horror in "It's a Wonderful Life."

Brigadier General James Stewart on the day of his observation flight over Vietnam on 20 February 1966.

Jimmy Stewart visiting his old base at Tibenham, Norfolk, England, in 1975. You can see the metal fence on which he was perched in the picture at the beginning of this article (Terry Fincher).

Conclusion

2020

The simple answer to whether German Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) and Reichs President (Reichspräsident) Karl Doenitz (Dönitz) was a war criminal is "yes." That is because he was convicted on two of three war crimes charges. Doenitz was sentenced to ten years in prison (actually over 11 years including time served). However, simply saying that Doenitz was a war criminal does not answer why.

Let's look at why Karl Doenitz was convicted at Nuremberg.

Doenitz's Background

Karl Doenitz was born in Grünau near Berlin, Germany, in 1891. He enlisted in the Kaiserliche Marine ("Imperial Navy") in 1910 and was a Leutnant zur See (acting sub-lieutenant) on the cruiser SMS Breslau when World War I began. Doenitz transferred to the submarine service as an Oberleutnant zur See (full Lieutenant) in 1916 and attended the submarine service's school at Flensburg-Mürwik, graduating on 3 January 1917. He rose to command UB-68 in the Mediterranean but was forced to scuttle his boat on 4 October 1918, becoming a prisoner of war. In 1920, he returned to Germany.

During the interwar period, Doenitz remained in the navy (which was considered an honor, as the size of the German military was greatly restricted due to the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles) and continued his rise through the ranks. When the Reichsmarine was renamed Kriegsmarine in 1935, Doenitz was in command of the training cruiser Emden. Germany was prohibited at this time from having a submarine fleet, but Hitler negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 that erased this prohibition. Almost immediately, Doenitz was placed in command of the U-boat flotilla Weddigen.

Doenitz, now a Kapitän zur See (naval captain), began developing U-boat group tactics. He quickly became the dominant person in the entire new U-boat service. Doenitz preferred smaller submarines, as opposed to some other powers such as France and Japan that built giant submarines, due to pragmatic issues such as cost of construction and tactics. Ultimately, he settled on the Type VII submarine, which had a range of 6200 miles that later was extended to 8700 miles. In terms of tactics, Doenitz settled on the Rudeltaktik ("wolfpack"), wherein groups of U-boats would overwhelm a convoy's defenses by working together. This was somewhat similar to similar strategies in the German Army (Heer) in which massed tank tactics were favored. Improved radio communications, directed by a central command in Berlin, made the wolfpack tactic possible.

Following a 14 August 1939 meeting at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden with his ministers and military leaders, Adolf Hitler decided to wage war with Poland. On 15 August 1939, sent a coded message to Doenitz, since 28 January 1939 the  Commodore (Kommodore) and Commander of Submarines (Führer der Unterseeboote). It instructed Doenitz to send the U-boat fleet to sea and to take up stations off the coast of Great Britain.

Doenitz's problems began quickly. On the first day of the war with Great Britain, 3 September 1939, U-30 (Oberleutnant Fritz-Julius Lemp) torpedoed and sank the 13,465-ton British liner Athenia about 200 miles northwest of Ireland. There were 98 passenger and 19 crew deaths. The sinking clearly violated international law, which required U-boats to stop the ship and allow the passengers to disembark. The Kriegsmarine commander, Grand Admiral Raeder, quickly denied responsibility for the sinking, Lemp informed Doenitz of the truth when he returned to port. Doenitz sent Lemp to Berlin to talk to Raeder, who referred the matter to Hitler. After consultations, Hitler decided to keep the matter secret. despite the fact that this was a violation of the rules of war. The German Propaganda Ministry blamed the loss on the British themselves, which began or at least accelerated a cycle of distrust between the two naval powers.

Adherence to the "rules of war" quickly fell by the wayside. On 23 September 1939, Hitler ordered that any freighters using a radio should be stopped and then sunk or captured. On 27 September 1939, he ordered the enforcement of Prize Regulations ended, and on 2 October 1939, all darkened ships in the war zone were made subject to immediate attack. On 17 November 1939, U-boats were authorized to attack any passenger liners (such as the Athenia) that were considered "hostile."

Doenitz was not blameless in the gradual but inevitable adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Raeder and others later described Doenitz as a fervent Hitler follower and confirmed anti-Semite. Doenitz was in favor of unrestricted submarine warfare, along with Raeder. However, ultimately this was not his decision to make. That decision could only be made by the head of state, Hitler, because of its obvious political ramifications. Heartily embracing the new policies, Doenitz, on 1 October 1939, became a Konteradmiral (rear admiral) and "Commander of the Submarines" (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, BdU). This placed him in supreme command of all U-boat operations and, ultimately, of the German command of the vast majority of the Battle of the Atlantic.

Doenitz's wolfpack tactics proved successful. Men died in freezing waters or of starvation in lifeboats or trapped below decks of sinking tankers. Sometimes, entire crews perished and there were no survivors, no memories, sometimes not even any flotsam or jetsam. It was a brutal campaign and both sides used brutal tactics.

Despite occasional (and unproven) accusations of atrocities, U-boat commanders often helped the survivors of the ships they had sunk, giving them directions and food. This may have been cold comfort to the survivors, but it showed a certain camaraderie of the sea when truly vicious sailors might have acted quite differently. In the Laconia Incident of 12 September 1942, Doenitz personally ordered nearby U-boats to attempt rescue operations of passengers from a sinking ocean liner off the African coast. Over 1000 men, women, and children were saved who otherwise might not have been. Doenitz was not as hard-hearted as some might have wished to portray him, and this would count in his favor... later. However, after the attempted rescue backfired because American aircraft attacked the Axis ships attempting the rescue, Doenitz issued the Laconia Orders forbidding such rescues in the future. This was very controversial, and some U-boat commanders continued to render aid to people struggling in the water after their ships sank despite the orders.

The U-boat campaign had its ups and downs, reaching peaks in early 1941 (the "Happy Time") and then again in 1942 during Unternehmen Pauckenschlag (Operation Drumbeat), when U-boats operated with virtual impunity off the eastern coast of the United States. Hundreds of ships were sunk as U-boats attacked any non-German ship they saw, including neutral ships. Doenitz personally controlled U-boat operations from his headquarter in Paris, making frequent trips to the major U-boat bases along the French coast to greet returning U-boats and provide inspiration to the sailors. By May 1943, however, new Allied tactics and defensive equipment had neutered the U-boat fleet. It never again posed a true threat to the Allies despite achieving regular small successes.

On 30 January 1943, Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Grand Admiral due to the latter's disagreements with Hitler and the failures of the German surface fleet. By 1944, Doenitz's U-boats were preoccupied with mere survival given the oppressive Allied advantage at sea. Hitler, however, never lost faith in Doenitz, perhaps because only the U-boat service continued to report victories (albeit increasingly rarely) right up until the end of the war. When Hitler committed suicide on 30 April 1945, he appointed Doenitz (to the surprise of many) as his successor. This was more a formality than anything substantive, however, as Doenitz's only substantive act was the surrender of the Reich's armed forces.

The Allies arrested Doenitz at his seat of government in Flensburg, northern Germany, on 23 May 1945. The Allies dissolved the German government and sent Doenitz to Nuremberg to be tried for war crimes. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg indicted him on three counts: (1) "conspiracy to commit crimes against peace," (2) "Planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression," and (3) "crimes against the laws of war." Doenitz was not indicted on a fourth count of "crimes against humanity."

With the cream of the Kriegsmarine to choose from, Doenitz asked Otto Kranzbühler, a crafty lawyer who some considered the best counsel in the trials, to represent him. It was a wise choice. Kranzbühler was a young and flamboyant junior naval officer (he held the rank of Flottenrichter (Navy Judge in the rank of a Kapitän zur See)) who came into his own as Doenitz's counsel. He may have been in part the inspiration for the classic defense lawyer played by Maximilian Schell in "Judgment At Nuremberg" (1961). As a stunt, Kranzbühler made his initial appearance before the international tribunal in his full Kriegsmarine uniform (causing the Soviet guards to almost arrest him). This was calculated to imply that if the head of the Navy was on trial, then it would be the Navy that would defend him.  It also implied that it was the German Navy itself that was on trial and that the navy did not disown its former leader. In a military court, this meant something.

Kranzbühler put on what may fairly be characterized as a brilliant defense. As suggested by his dramatic entrance, Kranzbühler took the charges against Doenitz personally. He immediately made it clear to the tribunal that, though on the losing side of the war, Dönitz was not deserving of the indictments brought against him. Kranzbühler also argued that if the Grand Admiral of the German Navy was to be tried, he should be addressed by the court with the respect he deserved as a military leader. The Allies, however, did not agree. While the prosecutors (including Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson) and judges at Nuremberg continued to address Doenitz without any recognition, Kranzbühler always referred to his client as Grand Admiral, or "Herr Grossadmiral."

The first charge was that sinking Allied freighters was illegal. To defend Dönitz, Kranzbühler shrewdly obtained from US Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, an interrogatory in which he extracted various items of information about American naval practice. Nimitz answered sensitive questions about the practice of the United States Navy concerning submarines and merchant ships. These included US naval practice when a submarine crew had no way of knowing whether or not a ship was armed. Nimitz's answers made it clear that the German practice of attacking merchant ships was indistinguishable from the United States' unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific. Kranzbühler skillfully used the interrogatory to show that what his client had done, which was similar to the actions of the Allies was in accordance with the practice of war at sea at the time, and therefore was not criminal.

The prosecution unwisely attempted to use the Laconia Orders that forbade rescues of passengers and crew against Doenitz. This backfired badly on the Allies because it enabled Kranzbühler, who was no fool, to bring up Doenitz's attempt first to try to save the passengers. The fact that the attacks on the U-boats were by US aircraft was doubly effective because it reinforced Admiral Nimitz's admission to the brutality of the US military. In a naval war that saw savagery and mistakes by both sides, guilt and innocence became shades of gray.

Kranzbühler's audacious gambits worked. The Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships. However, this was a limited victory, as the Tribunal did hold that the sinking of neutral ships was a violation of existing law.

Acquitted of the most serious charge against him, Doenitz was sentenced by the Tribunal to 10 years in prison for his conviction related to waging a war of aggression. Doenitz's carrying out of the order to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare was not officially included in his sentence, but it almost certainly influenced the verdict. It was the main reason why most judges wanted him convicted. Doenitz served 10 years in Spandau Prison plus the additional 18 months he had spent at the Mondorf and Nuremberg prison camps while awaiting trial and being tried. However, but for the efforts of Kranzbühler, particularly in respect to his defense to Count #3 above, Dönitz likely would have served a much longer sentence or perhaps even have been sentenced to death (the British and Soviet judges wanted to execute Doenitz and were only restrained by the US and French judges). It was one of the most amazing legal coups of the post-war trials.

Conclusion

Doenitz was not a "good man" as we would understand the term. He did not share our values. Among other faults, Karl Doenitz hated Jews, he helped to initiate and waged a ruthless war of annihilation that killed defenseless people on ships, he strove to imbue the submarine service with an air of Hitlerism, and he gladly accepted the leadership of one of the most brutal regimes of all time. However, this article is not about whether we would have anything common with Doenitz, a convicted war criminal. He was justly convicted for his crimes and served his time. His trial and defense by lawyer Kranzbühler before the Military Tribunal served the useful purpose of discharging some of the tensions between the victors and the vanquished of World War, and that at least made up for some of the violence Karl Doenitz committed on behalf of the Third Reich.

2020

A Grave Injustice Done to a War Hero

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and Douglas Bader at the conclusion of World War II. If the meeting appears a bit awkward, there is a good reason for that which we will get to below.

Why was RAF Air Marshal Hugh Dowding fired? Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding was fired (“reassigned”) at the close of the Battle of Britain for reasons that are widely misunderstood. This has cast a shadow of sorts over his legacy. I shall go through some facts about Dowding as I explain why I believe he was the victim of politics and was not fired for cause.

Dowding spent over a decade before World War II in Royal Air Force leadership positions building up the institution and infrastructure. While not considered the "father" of the force (that was Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard), Dowding played a large role in building the modern RAF that wound up facing off against the Luftwaffe.

Dowding presides over the graduation exercises at RAF College, Cranwell, in 1930. He became the director of training at the Air Ministry in 1926 and advanced rapidly after that.

Air Marshal Hugh Dowding Guided the RAF Through Dangerous Times

Dowding, intending to retire in June 1939, showed excellent judgment after being asked to remain in office due to the war crisis. He displayed an outstanding grasp of the air war and the proper uses of the RAF interceptor force. There was nothing outdated about his thinking and he clearly understood the power and limitations of modern fighters. He developed the “Dowding System” for early warning of air attacks that incorporated radar chains on the south coast, radio control of aircrews, the Duxford Operations Room, and the underground Operations Room at Headquarters Fighter Command, Bentley Priory, Middlesex. The cutting-edge Dowding System proved vital during the war. Hugh Dowding was no Dudley Pound falling asleep at strategy meetings.

Dowding established the entire RAF command and control operation, including RAF Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory.

Dowding carefully husbanded his forces throughout 1940. His first major policy position was on 15 May 1940 to refuse the French request to send “clouds of planes” to fight the lost cause in France. This undoubtedly was the right position in terms of preserving forces to protect the homeland. The War Cabinet agreed with Dowding and this had major strategic and political implications, as it began the growing divergence between French and British strategy and war aims.

In his role as the commanding officer of the newly created RAF Fighter Command beginning in 1936, Dowding oversaw the introduction of the Hawker Hurricane, above, and other modern fighters.

Dowding kept close track of British fighter forces and was careful to protect them from any unnecessary threats. On 3 June 1940, he warned that the RAF would literally run out of Hawker Hurricanes (the backbone of the RAF fighter force despite the flashier Spitfire) within two weeks at the current loss rate. This justified his earlier decision to not send his precious remaining fighters to France.

On 11 June 1940, with France crumbling, Dowding reiterated his position against sending fighters to France (they demanded “the entire RAF”). Churchill agreed with him. This was an extremely tough decision because it furthered the breach between France and the UK. However, Dowding was looking after his country’s survival.

On 23 July 1940, Dowding succeeded in getting convoys routed away from the east coast and sent north around Scotland instead. He knew the RAF was so weak it could not protect the ships even right along the coastline. On 28 July 1940, he moved his fighters closer to the Channel to better confront the Luftwaffe, a very aggressive move that led to the famous Luftwaffe losses in August.

While RAF planes were in short supply early in the conflict, pilots became scarce as time went on. Dowding took decisive steps to maintain enough of both.

Despite his wise moves that preserved the fighter force, Dowding ran into a huge problem of a dwindling supply of fighter pilots. He solved this on 17 August 1940 by receiving permission to poach pilots in training in other branches of the RAF.

So far, so good. Dowding skillfully preserved his fighter force and kept it at full strength through a sequence of canny moves. In September 1940, after the peak of the Battle of Britain, his problems began. That is when Air Marshal Hugh Dowding finally met enemies he could not overcome.

The RAF groups in 1940 with their relative strengths. The most important group for Britain's survival was No. 11 Group at lower right, led by Keith Park, which faced the brunt of the Luftwaffe onslaught.

Dowding Falls Victim to Careerists in the RAF

Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory of No. 12 Group (north of London), who was a bit of a schemer, had developed what became known as the “Big Wing” concept. In simple terms, the Big Wing involved assembling a large force of fighters (three or four squadrons) over RAF bases before sending them as a group to attack incoming Luftwaffe bomber streams. This had some advantages - it meant maximum-strength interceptions. However, its major failing was that it took time to assemble these large forces. By the time the RAF set out to intercept the bombers, the Germans had completed their work of bombing cities and turned back to France. The Big Wing tactic, however, worked well for forces further back from the “front” that had time to assemble before their own bases came under attack.


Dowding did not like the Big Wing concept. He preferred sending smaller groups of fighters immediately as they got airborne to intercept the bombers. This disrupted enemy bombing operations and gave more opportunities for shoot-downs. Dowding’s strategy was arguably better for front-line units that were under immediate threat and did not have time for leisurely assemblies. Each strategy obviously had strengths and weaknesses and reasonable people could disagree. This may seem like a minor policy disagreement that could have been settled over after-dinner cognacs, but it led to Dowding’s downfall.

Keith Park in his personalized Hurricane, which he flew to the ten airfields under his command in No. 11 Group. His personal insignia, Cerberus, is to the extreme left.

The problem for Dowding was that the Air Ministry, which never had shown much leadership or skill in operations, backed Leigh-Mallory (and had ulterior motives for doing so, as we shall see below). New Zealand native Air Vice Marshal Keith Park in command of Fighter Command in southeast England, however, agreed with Dowding. In other words, the two men at the tip of the spear, who had the biggest responsibility for confronting the Luftwaffe and the most success in the Battle of Britain, were against the “Big Wing” concept. RAF people further back from the hot spot and sitting in cozy offices, on the other hand, liked it.

So, two power blocks emerged within the RAF: the warriors Dowding and Park, opposed by the Air Ministry and Leigh-Mallory (who was in command of a secondary zone but coveted Park’s prestigious job). They could not coexist, one power block or the other was going to win and the other lose. This internal struggle ultimately became more about power than strategy.

From right to left, Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, King George VI, and Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon during the Battle of Britain.

It’s not like Dowding was not appreciated. However, his support was not institutional within the RAF. He was on good terms with the King, who followed events extremely closely and knew exactly who was doing what. On 30 September 1940, Dowding, already a Knight, received the further honor of the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (investiture on 8 October 1940). However, the fight - the real fight, never mind the air war itself - was on within the Air Ministry to gain the laurels for the saving of the country during the Battle of Britain. And this battle was fought tooth-and-nail in the corridors of power, and Dowding's downfall was close at hand.

Douglas Bader swinging his artificial leg into his fighter before a 1945 flight.

The tipping point was the support of Squadron Leader Douglas Bader for Leigh-Mallory and the Air Ministry. Bader, within Leigh-Mallory’s command, was a legend within the RAF for, among other things, remaining in action despite losing both of his legs in an air accident. Bader also just so happened to have a Member of Parliament in his unit. As a major propaganda hero (even the Germans knew all about him), Bader had a lot of pull that went way above his rank. Like any good soldier, he wanted to support his commander - Leigh-Mallory.

As always seems to happen in bureaucratic infighting, the battle was decided at a staff meeting. At a key high-level RAF meeting held on 17 October 1940, with the Battle of Britain basically won, Leigh-Mallory brought Bader (who had no reason to be there) to argue for the BIg Wing concept and against Dowding and Park. The political clout of Bader, combined with the institutional power of Leigh-Mallory and the Air Ministry itself, was too much for Dowding (who could be shunted aside as “too old”) and Park (who wasn’t even English, for goodness sakes). This meeting led directly to the sacking of both Dowding and Park - the two men most responsible for the winning of the Battle of Britain.

On 29 September 1942 at Debden, Air Chief Marshal Sholto Douglas conducts a change-over review of the three U.S. Eagle Squadrons. Trailing him are Major General Carl Spaatz (right) and Brigadier General Frank O'Driscoll Hunter (left) - Commanding Generals of USAAF in Great Britain and 8th Air Force Fighter Command.

Where They All Wound Up

Dowding then “retired” (he actually just went to a staff position in the United States, the standard dumping ground for the losers such as Lord Halifax in British bureaucratic struggles). Park was transferred to a humiliating training position (he later rebounded with prestigious commands including Malta and is considered quite a war hero in New Zealand).

Trafford Leigh-Mallory reaped many rewards from his coup against Dowding and Park. For instance, above he makes official remarks at the grand 1943 Battle of Britain Day held in London. Dowding and Park, employed elsewhere, could not attend.

And Leigh-Mallory? He got what he had wanted all along, Park’s prestigious command of the No. 11 Group in southeastern England. Guess who got Dowding’s position? The real head of the Air Ministry, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Sholto Douglas (Chief of the Air Staff Charles Portal was brand new to the job in October 1940 and likely had little stake in these internal struggles). In other words, Douglas, who was really running things as the "power behind the throne," got rid of the other power block in one fell swoop and put himself and his cronies in position to claim credit for the success of the Battle of Britain.

Bader got his rewards, too. He quickly received the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) on 12 December 1940 and was promoted to acting wing commander and became one of the first "wing leaders" on 18 March 1941. In 1941, Bader again combined with Leigh-Mallory in an abortive attempt to equip Spitfires with four .303 machine guns, which Bader personally preferred, instead of .50 machine guns. The larger guns proved more effective and Bader's plans came to naught. He was shot down in combat on 9 August 1941 and spent the remaining war years as a guest of the German government, primarily in Colditz Castle Oflag IV-C.

Douglas Bader's home for much of World War II was Colditz Castle POW camp.

The "Big Wing" concept ultimately turned into a big flop. The claims made by Leigh-Mallory and Bader turned out to be vastly inflated. RAF ace Johnnie Johnson summed up the matter nicely:

Douglas was all for the Big Wings to counter the German formation[s]. I think there was room for both tactics – the Big Wings and the small squadrons. It might well have been fatal had Park always tried to get his squadrons into "Balbos," for not only would they have taken longer to get to their height, but sixty or seventy packed climbing fighters could have been seen for miles and would have been sitting ducks for higher 109s.

So, there were pluses and minuses to the "Big Wing," more appropriate for units further from the front than front-line units as Dowding and Park knew. It certainly was not worth a major leadership shakeup in the RAF. In any event, the days of large Luftwaffe daylight raids were over. The "Wing" name lived on as an organizational title meaning a group of squadrons, but the "Big Wing" concept died a quick death.

Conclusion

There was no reason to remove Dowding (or Park). They had both done outstanding work and continued to do outstanding work. The “Big Wing” concept had major failings and was just a handy way to get rid of them. Dowding and Park were the victims of a political purge in which the victors took the spoils. After they had done the “heavy lifting” that won the Battle of Britain and having shouldered the risk of massive failure, Dowding and Park were efficiently disposed of by the real powers within the RAF.

In a way, Dowding was a victim of his own success. Having won the Battle of Britain through brilliant leadership, he created a nation-saving victory that others coveted - and basically took from him.

Sir Hugh Dowding (left) at a 1949 commemoration of World War II.

2020

Both Sides Wanted Narvik, But Only One Got It

A rare original color photograph of the German battleship Tirpitz underway in a Norwegian fjord (perhaps Altafjord) ca. 1943.

Narvik was important to both sides for several reasons. Overall, however, it was more important to the Germans than to the Allies. The Germans prevailed because Narvik fit into their overall presence in Scandinavia more than it ever could have been of use to the British. The British basically just wanted to keep a foothold on the mainland for very vague and ill-defined purposes. Ultimately, Narvik was just too remote for the British to keep bothering with and maintaining a presence there simply wasn’t worth the effort. German control of the rest of Norway decided the issue.

a map of Narvik ca. 1940. Note that the rail line comes in from the right (east) and heads down to the Narvik port (center). The outlet to the sea is off to the left. (HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, The Campaign in Norway Map 9).

I’ve been to Narvik. The basic layout hasn’t changed much since World War II. The typical entryway is via rail from Stockholm, a grueling 24-hour ride. The city is extremely isolated by public transportation. Narvik is the only town on the Ofoten rail line (Ofotbanen) in Norway, with the closest stop being the ski resort at Riksgränsen, Sweden. If you wish to drive south, you must use ferries. If you sail, it is a long journey down the coast to the Baltic Sea. There are only about 10-12 flights a day to Harstad/Narvik Airport, all from Oslo and other Norwegian cities.

It is a rough, rugged, beautiful region with an economy that is (or at least was) based on mining. This is obvious once you get a look at the port with its giant ore-processing equipment. It is further from Berlin to Narvik than it is to Moscow, so German troops marching up Norway advanced about as far as any Wehrmacht troops during World War II.

Luftwaffe seaplanes, such as this Do 24, were vitally important in maintaining the German presence in northern Norway. You can see the shattered buildings of Narvik in the background (Federal Archive Bild 101II-MW-5618-02).

One reason Narvik was strategically important was its location at the end of the only rail line in northern Norway from the south (as far as I know, that’s still the case). The Germans could shuttle supplies there by land through Sweden. Now, military access through Sweden was tricky and the Swedes placed a lot of conditions on transit rights, but basically, the Germans could maintain a large garrison at Narvik supplied by land rather than by risky sea convoys. The Germans worked out an accommodation with the Swedes that pretty much allowed the shipment on the line of everything but actual troops (and some of that apparently went on, too).

German destroyer Z11 Bernd von Arnim beached and scuttled in the fjord Rombaksbotn near Narvik, Norway, 13 April 1940.

Another reason Narvik was important was all the mining that went on there (much of it in Sweden, which sold it to the Germans). Iron ore mining in the area began in 1903. The Swedes did their part to exploit the area by building their rail line to the border, while Norway finished the line the short remaining distance to the port itself. Mining company LKAB built massive mining infrastructure at the port. The port of Narvik is ice-free, making it the perfect spot to collect ore brought overland from northern Sweden and ship it to customers overseas. The Germans desperately needed natural resources, and they were always on Hitler's mind. Since they controlled southern Norway, they could ship ore down along the coast without too much interference. The Narvik ore made a lot of German tanks and ships and that alone made it of prime strategic importance for the Germans.

British ships batter Germans in Narvik in April 1940.

A third reason Narvik was important was as a supply base for operations further north. Extreme Northern Norway was strategically important because it helped secure northern Finland, as German ships could sail around it to the line anchored at Petsamo. The fjords also were great places to park naval units that could attack the Allied Arctic convoys (such as battleship Tirpitz). At the end of the war, the Germans retreating from northern Finland withdrew into a secure defensive sector front anchored by Narvik. Since Sweden was neutral, that line protected basically the entire rest of Norway.

German paratroopers (Fallschirmjäger) during the Battle of Narvik in 1940.

Perhaps most importantly, the Germans simply wanted to kick the British completely off the European mainland and secure the entire country of Norway. Adolf Hitler took a keen personal interest in the battle at Narvik, where General Dietl barely survived with his force until the British were forced to withdraw on 7 June 1940 by units marching up from the south (a very rough march). For the rest of the war, Hitler was paranoid that the British would try to invade there and kept huge garrisons in Norway. Allied reverses in France ultimately decided events at Narvik. Hitler felt that Dietl’s success at Narvik was so important that Dietl was the first soldier to receive the Oak Leaves.

The German troops at Narvik only survived in 1940 because the Luftwaffe was able to drop paratroopers to reinforce General Dietl's weak force.

So, Narvik had great strategic importance. For the Germans, it was vital to eliminate the British presence and secure the area’s mineral and geographical advantages, while the British basically were just trying to deny the area to the Germans. The Germans ultimately prevailed because their successes on land overcame the clear British advantage at sea. However, it was a very close victory for the Germans decided more by the general war situation than by local military factors.

German troops firing at Royal Navy ships at Narvik.

2020